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EDITORIAL COMMENT
THE DEGREES OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE
UNITED NATIONS ERA
The self-determination idea is closely identified with Woodrow Wilson, who
first used the term publicly in 1918,1 but it did not emerge as a principle of
positive international law until the Soviet Union insisted on it at the 1945 San
Francisco Conference on the United Nations.' It did not appear in the League of
Nations Covenant. In 1921 an international commission decisively rejected an
extreme form of it in the Aaland Islands case. Even though the Commission
recognized that the vast majority of the people of the Aaland Islands would
choose union with Sweden over their existing attachment to Finland, the Commis-
sion denied them any right to secede.' It said:
To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions
of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they
belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy
order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international
life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the
State as a territorial and political unity.4 "
The United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference had misgivings
about resuscitating the self-determination idea in binding treaty form.5 Neverthe-
less, the idea found its way into Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter as the
principle of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples." The drafters did
not bother to define self-determination or to identify who the "peoples" were,
but the Soviet Foreign Minister referred to the idea as "equality and the self-deter-
mination of nations." 6 He seemed to view the beneficiaries to be the populations
of colonies and the populations of territories then under League of Nations Man-
'See Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian
Conception, 70 AJIL 1, 2 (1976).
See RUTH B. RUSSELL & JEANNEITE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1945, at 810-11 (1958).
' The case nevertheless demonstrates that, as early as 1921, questions of self-determination in a
noncolonial context were not considered solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the resisting state.
Finland had argued that they were, but the League of Nations Council took up the matter. See
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, TEN YEARS OF WORLD CO-OPERATION 28-29 (1930); DENYS P. IVlYERs, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 298-99 (1935).
" Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs presented to the League of Nations Council, League of
Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921), quoted in HURST HANNUM, AUToNOMY, SOVEP.EIGNTY, AND
SELF-DETERMINATION: THE AcCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 30 (1990). See also A. RIGO
SUREDA, THE EVOLUTON OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEERMINATION: A STUDY OF UNrrED NATIONS
PRACTCE 29-34 (1973). More recently, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded
that international law does not recognize a right to secede-or more broadly, a right independently to
choose its form of political organization-of an ethnic group such as the Miskito population of
Nicaragua. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/IL.62, doc.
10, rev. 3 (1983).




dates.7 There is evidence, though, that a broader definition of "peoples" was
intended.'
The right of self-determination did not appear explicitly in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,9 but it became the centerpiece of the General
Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples."° It appears in both of the 1966 UN Covenants on Human
Rights.' Brownlie treats it as "probably" a peremptory norm.12 Arguably it is, in
its anticolonialist form, but surely not when it puts on all its possible faces.
In fact, the self-determination principle in the UN era has a great many faces.
The one that virtually everybody now agrees it has is freedom from colonial domi-
nation, at least when the domination is of people of color in their homeland by
other racial groups.'" The International Court ofJustice has endorsed the princi-
ple in this form, in its 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia 4 and in its 1975
Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, where it defined the principle as "the
need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples." 15 For many years the
majority of states in the UN General Assembly asserted that the expressed will of
peoples to be free from colonial domination was the only face self-determina-
tion had.
Under pressure from the West, the General Assembly in 1970 expanded the
concept beyond anticolonialism. In its Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations,' 6 the General Assembly said-among other
things-that emergence into any political status freely determined by a people
constitutes a mode of implementing the right of self-determination. The declara-
tion disclaimed any intent to authorize or encourage the dismemberment of
states, but its disclaimer was tied to a concept of internal self-determination.
It said:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
7 On the definition of "peoples," see Anna Michalska, Rights of Peoples to Self-determination in
International Law, in IssUEs OF SELF-DETERMINATION 71 (William Twining ed., 1991).
s See SUREDA, supra note 4, at 99-101.
"GA Res. 217A, UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Article 21 did set forth rights now identified with
internal self-determination, without labeling them as such.
'0 GA Res. 1514, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960).
"International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 1, 993
UNTS 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 1, 999 UNTS 171.
12 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 513 (4th ed. 1990). Brownlie says
that the principle's precise ramifications have not yet been worked out. Id. at 597. See also H6ctor
Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Rev.1, at 13 (1980) (defining the principle to exclude a right of secession for
peoples not under colonial and alien domination); H6ctor Gros Espiell, Self-Determination andJus
Cogens, in UN LAw/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 167 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
13 See, e.g., Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AJIL 459 (1971).
"4 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ REP. 16, 31 (Advisory
Opinion of June 21).
's Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ REP. 12, 33 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16).
16 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Annex to GA Res. 2625, UN
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 ILM 1292 (1970).
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government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or color.'7
Thus, the disclaimer referred only to a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.' The
disclaimer was reiterated in the Vienna Declaration emanating from the 1993 UN
World Conference on Human Rights, with one significant change. The Vienna
Declaration exempted only "a Government representing the whole people be-
longing to the territory without distinction of any kind." 9 These disclaimers are a
far cry from the General Assembly's formulation in 1960, when it said: "Any
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations." 20
Of course, these are nonbinding instruments. Nevertheless, they purport to,
and probably do, reflect an opinio juris. In the human rights field, a strong
showing of opiniojuris may overcome a weak demonstration of state practice to
establish a customary rule. 21 The striking contrast between the 1960 and 1970
General Assembly formulations suggests that from about 1970 on, there could be
a right of "peoples"-still not well defined-to secede from an established state
that does not have a fully representative form of government, or at least to secede
from a state whose government excludes people of any race, creed or color from
political representation when those people are the ones asserting the right and
they have a claim to a defined territory.22 By j993, the right had arguably ex-
panded to be assertable against a government that is unrepresentative of people
who are defined by characteristics not limited to race, creed or color.
An arguable, limited right of secession is only one of the numerous faces of
self-determination. 23 Mentioned below are the more prominent ones that have ap-
7 1d. at 124, 9 ILM at 1296.
" See Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles concerning Friendly Relations. A Survey, 65
AJIL 713, 732 (1971); see also Antonio Cassese, Political Self-Determination-Old Concepts and New
Developments, in UN LAw/FuNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 137, 144-45 (noting the diffi-
culty of determining when a government is "representative").
, 19 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, pt. I, para. 2, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (pt. I)
(1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1661 (1993) (emphasis added).
20 GA Res. 1514, supra note 10, at 67.
21 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AJIL 146, 149 (1987).
22 See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITImACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 92-96 (1978); Ved
P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: V alidity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 257, 269-70, 275 (1981). On the territorial point, see text at note 32 infra. Contrast what
U Thant said before Resolution 2625 had been adopted: "As an international organization, the
United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the
principle of secession of a part of its Member State." UN MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1970, at 36.
Writing in 1989, Hurst Hannum said, "[C]onstant state practice and the weight of authority require
the conclusion that such a right [to secede] does not yet exist." HANNUM, supra note 4, at 49. Thomas
Franck also finds no general right to secede, but notes that a minority within a state, especially if it
occupies discrete territory, may have a right to secede-roughly analogous to a decolonization right
-if it is persistently and egregiously denied political and social equality as well as the opportunity to
retain its cultural identity. Thomas M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in
PEOPX.ES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 13-14 (Catherine Brilmann, Ren& Lefeber &
Marjoleine Zieck eds., 1993).
s For recognition that some concepts, such as nonsovereign autonomy, minority rights and integra-
tion with an existing state, might be faces of self-determination rather than denials of it, see MICHLA
POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAw AND PRACTICE 3, 25-26 (1982). Another face-as a build-
ing block toward a democratic entitlement-is discussed in Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to
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peared.2 4 Of course, some of them remain quite controversial because of disagree-
ment either over what is meant by "peoples" or over what is meant by self-deter-
mination itself.25 The many faces include:
(1) The established right to be free from colonial domination, with plenty
of well-known examples in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.
(2) The converse of that-a right to remain dependent, if it represents the
will of the dependent people who occupy a defined territory, as in the case of
the Island of Mayotte in the Comoros, or Puerto Rico.
(3) The right to dissolve a state, at least if done peacefully, and to form
new states on the territory of the former one, as in the former Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia except for Serbia
and Montenegro might even be considered an example of this, after the
initial skirmish in Slovenia ended and the Yugoslav federal forces ceased
operating as such in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.2" The later fighting in
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina could be seen as efforts not so much to hold
the old state of Yugoslavia together as to define the territories and ethnic
composition of the new states, including possible new states within Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
(4) The disputed right to secede, as in the case of Bangladesh and Eritrea.
(5) The right of divided states to reunite, as in Germany.
(6) The right of limited autonomy, short of secession, for groups defined
territorially or by common ethnic, religious and linguistic bonds-as in au-
tonomous areas within confederations.
(7) Rights of minority groups within a larger political entity, as recognized
in Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights27 and in the Gen-
eral Assembly's 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.2"
(8) The internal self-determination freedom to choose one's own form of
government, or even more sharply, the right to a democratic form of govern-
ment, as in Haiti.
Democratic Governance, 86 AJIL 46 (1992). See also Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by Non-State Groups
in International Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481, 487 (1992) (noting limited categories of cases in
which claims to separate statehood have been recognized); Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking Self-Determi-
nation: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRAcusEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 21
(1992) (criticizing the limited "conventional" view of self-determination).
" They are expressed here as "rights." They could also be viewed as "remedies." See S. James
Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CoNTFmP. PRoBS. 131 (1993).
2'5 For a somewhat different typology of self-determination claims actually made, see Benedict
Kingsbury, Self-Determination and "Indigenous Peoples," 86 ASIL PROC. 383, 384 (1992).
26 But see Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONrzsP. PROBS. 57 (1993).
27 Supra note 11. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
141-247 (1991). Article 27 does not use the term "self-determination." Since Article 1 does use it
without relating it to minority rights, it may be argued that the rights in Article 27 are distinct from
self-determination rights. See Rosalyn Higgins, Comments on Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to
Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 22, at 29, 32.
2' Annex to GA Res. 47/135, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 210, UN Doc. A/47/49 (Vol.
I) (1992), reprinted in 32 ILM 911 (1993). See also ILO Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, in 2 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVEN-
TIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1991, at 1436 (1992).
1994]
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 88:304
One must ask which of these is actually a right under international law, and
which just an aspiration of some groups or putative governments. Clearly, the
right to be free from alien colonial control is an established rule of international
law. One cannot categorically say the same about the other manifestations. Their
juridical status varies. Nevertheless, we can make some headway toward evaluating
each claim by borrowing some of the tools of social scientists. That is, we can try
to identify key variables that reduce the vast complexity of the problem to a
manageable form and can serve as rough predictors for normative assessment of
claims as they are made.
The key variables can be found in the General Assembly's 1970 Declaration of
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations29 and in the 1993
Vienna Declaration."0 As noted above, the disclaimer of any intent to authorize
dismemberment of a state-the most destabilizing form of self-determination-is
tied to the proposition of democratic government representing at least all the
races, creeds and colors within the state, or-according to the 1993 Vienna Decla-
ration-representing all people belonging to the territory without any distinction.
Dismemberment is at the end of a scale of claims, ranging from modest to ex-
tremely destabilizing, that includes all of those listed above. Moreover, as there
are degrees of claim, there are degrees of representative government, with abso-
lute dictatorship and all-inclusive democracy at the opposite extremes.
One can thus discern degrees of self-determination, with the legitimacy of each
tied to the degree of representative government in the state."' The relationship is
inverse between the degree of representative government, on one hand, and the
extent of destabilization that the international community will tolerate in a self-de-
termination claim, on the other. If a government is at the high end of the scale of
democracy, the only self-determination claims that will be given international
credence are those with minimal destabilizing effect. If a government is extremely
unrepresentative, much more destabilizing self-determination claims may well be
recognized.
In this schema, a claim of right to secede from a representative democracy is
not likely to be considered a legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination,
but a claim of right by indigenous groups within the democracy to use their own
languages and engage in their own noncoercive cultural practices is likely to be
recognized-not always under the rubric of self-determination, but recognized
nevertheless. Conversely, a claim of a right to secede from a repressive dictator-
ship may be regarded as legitimate. Not all secessionist claims are equally destabi-
lizing. The degree to which a claimed right to secede will be destabilizing may
depend on such things as the plausibility of the historical claim of the secessionist
group to the territory it seeks to slice off.32
19 Supra note 16.
1o Supra note 19.
31 Some manifestations might be called quasi-self-determination, but that term does not add much
to the analysis.
2 For example, if the secessionist group once occupied the territory as an independent state, the
destabilization posed by its claim may not be as great as if it seeks to carve out new territory for itself.
Cf Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L.
177 (1991). But even a claim to historic title may be quite destabilizing if the territory itself now
includes dissident minority groups.
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FIGURE 1. LEGTIMACYOF SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS
There are points between the extremes, as is illustrated by a diagram that may
look suspiciously like a product of the economist's craft."3 The vertical axis, meas-
uring the degree to which a particular self-determination claim is destabilizing,
reflects a prediction based on circumstances and experience at the time when the
claim is made. The horizontal axis, measuring the degree to which the particular
government is representative, reflects essentially a question of fact-though it
necessarily involves an element of judgment.
Any self-determination claim combining degrees of destabilization and govern-
ment representativeness that intersect above the curve would be unlikely to be
accepted by the international community. Conversely, if the intersection between
destabilization and government representativeness falls below the curve, the claim
would be recognized. The curve is concave, reflecting the rather limited sphere in
which self-determination claims are recognized. It never quite touches either axis,
indicating that even at the extremes a few claims could be regarded as legitimate.
The diagram assumes that any claim worth measuring is asserted insistently.
To revert to the examples already given: A claim of a right to secede by a group
without a plausible historical claim to its own territory would be almost certain to
fall above the curve and would not be recognized, no matter how unrepresenta-
tive the government-as indicated by the intersection point X. On the other hand,
a claim of right by an indigenous group to use its own language within the group
would be likely to be recognized even against a highly representative government
-as would be the case at intersection point Y.
The diagram, and the approach to self-determination it illustrates, may be prob-
lematic when the claim is for internal self-determination in the form of a more
s A similar chart, illustrating the interaction between state practice and opiniojuris in the proof of
custom, appears in Kirgis, supra note 21, at 150. When a noni rests heavily on two factors, or
variables, the two frequently are not mutually exclusive in practice even if the authoritative statement
of the norm treats each of them as an independent standard to be met.
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representative government. The degree to which that claim is likely to be destabi-
lizing could depend, to a greater extent than the other self-determination claims,
on the degree to which the existing government already is representative. If the
point on one axis is significantly influenced by the point on the other, the out-
come, illustrated by the intersection of the lines emanating from both points,
becomes indeterminate. But even when the claim is for a more representative
government, it is influenced by exogenous factors. Prominent among them would
be what Thomas Franck has identified as the emerging international right to
democratic governance. 4 As such a right becomes widely recognized, its capacity
to destabilize is lessened because it becomes difficult for an existing government
to explain any intransigent resistance to the claim in international forums. Thus,
the degree of destabilization, even in a claim for a more representative govern-
ment, would not depend entirely on the extent to which the current government
is representative, and the point of intersection (and thus the outcome as to legiti-
macy) would be determinate at least within a meaningful range.
The diagram above does not solve all self-determination questions, but it illus-
trates how the two key variables work together to guide decision making on the
legitimacy of a variety of self-determination claims. I do not claim that these are
the only variables at work; only that they are key, and that they therefore have
predictive power.
To summarize: The right of self-determination may be seen as a variable right,
depending on a combination of factors. The two most important of these seem to
be the degree of destabilization in any given claim, taking into account all the
circumstances surrounding it, and the degree to which the responding govern-
ment represents the people belonging to the territory. If a government is quite
unrepresentative, the international community may recognize even a seriously
destabilizing self-determination claim as legitimate.
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR.*
See Franck, supra note 23. See also Higgins, supra note 27, pointing out the Human Rights
Committee's emphasis on this form of self-determination and its widespread acceptance by govern-
ments reporting to the Committee.
*An earlier version of this Comment was presented on November 12, 1993, at a conference,
Building Nations, Ending Wars: The Wilsonian Legacy of Self-Determination, organized by the
Woodrow Wilson Birthplace and Museum, Staunton, Virginia.
